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In 1995, when the WTO was institutionalized, its perspectives were great. 
Today, 151 countries are member states, amongst which international trade 
moguls like the USA, Japan and China while even Russia is in the midst of its 
accession negotiations. Looks like a success story. 
Yet, to no avail, since the Doha Round seems doomed and further 
negotiations are endangered by the creation of two factions: developed and 
developing countries accusing each other of non-cooperation and, respectively, 
of exploitation.  
The WTO faces its biggest challenge: surpass self interests for the general 





“There are a number of ways of looking at the WTO. It’s an organization 
for liberalizing trade. It’s a forum for governments to negotiate trade 
agreements. It’s a place for them to settle trade disputes. It operates a system of 
trade rules. But it’s not Superman, just in case anyone thought it could solve - or 
cause - all the world’s problems!”(WTO, 2007) 
 
Regardless of the way in which one chooses to look at the World Trade 
Organization, better known under its short version as the WTO, this international 
body is, without a doubt, a remarkable piece of institutional machinery. Since its 
creation in 1995, when it took over from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, the former GATT, the number of member states has reached 150, 28 
additional countries now being in the midst of accession negotiations. More so, 
while GATT dealt with trade in goods, the WTO has a much larger sphere of 
interests, such as intellectual properties, investments and trade in services.  
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Free trade never seemed so close by, and the tale of developed and 
developing countries alike, enjoying the fruits of their labor and sharing in the 
global development was optimistically told and retold.  
Things were seemingly running smoothly, round after round of 
negotiations, and despite certain severe hiccups, such as the Cancún lack of 
consensus of 2003 and the international criticism that exploded into street 
fighting in Seattle, in 1999, the WTO kept moving forward. 
Until now. In July of 2006, the WTO talks were suspended. The cause of 
the suspension of negotiations was the fact that the six major member countries, 
designated as the G6, namely the EU, Brazil, India, Australia, Japan and the 
United States, formerly known as the “Five Interested Parties” before Japan was 
included, failed to make sufficient progress among themselves concerning the 
modalities of negotiations on two key areas, agriculture and non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA). The immediate cause of the breakdown of the G6 talks 
was the refusal or inability of the US Representative to improve on its offer of 
trade-distorting support level which was actually $3 million higher than the 2005 
level. (Khor, 2006) This offer was not acceptable to the other five members and 
in turn the whole Doha Round is now in peril. 
It is quite unbelievable how the offer of a single country, even if that 
country is the US, can make the whole system stumble. 149 countries breaking 
their stride for the simple whims of one member. Indeed, is it so unbelievable, it 
must be untrue. The problem seems to lie somewhere else. Not one country is 
able to block negotiations where the will of 149 others stands strong and united. 
If that will is truly strong and united. But further research shows that there is a 
huge division between member states, notably the developed countries, embodied 
by the OECD, and the developing as well as the least developed countries. Self 
interests are colliding with each other, and negotiations are derailed. Best 
intentioned policies and frameworks are widely mediated when secrecy and 
unfairness characterize the WTO talks. It is no wonder, then, that negotiations 
were suspended. It is a miracle talks even got this far. 
The aim of this paper is to try to unclear the reason for the current 
suspension of negotiations. The fact that the US did not or could not come with a 
better offer regarding its trade-distorting support level is just an excuse. Or, more 
likely, the last drop in a series of questionable measures and mechanisms that 
have been forced onto unprepared, unaware, economically and politically 
uncompetitive member states. Some time has passed since the US and the EU 
were the ones in charge, controlling each facet of the negotiations. In Cancún, a 
new group emerged, the G20, the most industrialized developing countries, and 
led by Brazil and India, they have started to make their voices heard. However, 
they are not the only group that has taken to protecting their own interests. Thus,   111 
the WTO has become an umbrella for different groups of interests pushing and 
making way for their personal good. Thus, even though the Doha Round has been 
termed the Development Round, development issues have been ironically 
accorded low priority during the negotiations, in favor of the agriculture and non-
agriculture market access agenda. Developing countries will supposedly be the 
worst off if the Doha Round does not reach consensus, since the development 
agenda was elaborated in their interest. Nevertheless, the way things have been 
going, developing countries would have been deeply affected by the current turn 
of events. In order to save the Doha Round, and at the same time protect the 
developing countries as well as grant some of the developed countries demands, 
serious changes must be operated in the way that the talks have been conducted 
until now, and especially in the negotiations agenda. 
The article is structured as follows. The next section will explore the 
WTO’s historical background, while trying to take into account the 
GATT/WTO’s evolution and to highlight its main successes. Section’s 3 main 
objectives are to analyze the current negotiations impasse, the hidden motives as 
well as the secretive and the unfair practices that have become the norm during 
the WTO Doha Round. In Section 4 we will first try to underline the important 
position played by the US in the suspension of talks, as well as, and especially, its 
key role in saving the Doha Development Round from self destruction. Also, we 
will proceed to identify several measures for resolving the present dead-end 
situation of the Doha Round. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Historical background of the WTO 
 
“The WTO’s creation on 1 January 1995 marked the biggest reform of 
international trade since after the Second World War. It also brought to reality - 
- in an updated form - the failed attempt in 1948 to create an International Trade 
Organization.” (WTO, 2007) 
 
The WTO is in itself a relatively young institution, but the idea that gave 
it life, the idea of an international body that would regulate trade and trade-related 
issues is very old indeed.  
Sixty years ago, on the 10
th of April 1947, representatives of nearly two 
dozen nations met in Geneva at the Palais des Nations to negotiate tariff 
reductions and finalize the text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
This meeting came to take place, starting with the Anglo-American discussions 
on Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942. The formidable 
personalities who shaped the negotiations - including Cordell Hull, John Maynard 
Keynes, James Meade, and William Clayton - as well as the negotiating positions   112 
and perspectives of the major nations and the numerous difficulties encountered 
in 1943-46 leading up to the 1947 GATT conference have had an enormous 
effect upon the ulterior shape and function of this trade agreement. 
The GATT was to be a provisional agreement that was supposed to pave 
the way for an international body, the International Trade Organization (ITO). 
Ironically, the United Sates, the main promoter of this process of trade 
liberalization, had a change of heart and at the last moment refused to sign the 
founding treaty of the ITO. Without US support, the whole project collapsed. 
Except that it left behind one very odd reminder: the GATT, which continued to 
function, with very little alteration from its original form, till 1994, when the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) was institutionalized and encompassed the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
There were eight successful Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN) under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The first was at Geneva in 1947 and the last, the Uruguay Round, was 
launched in Montevideo in 1986 and finished in 1995 in Marrakech, leading to 
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Few of these MTN Rounds 
except at the end, knew smooth negotiations.  
The international market’s growing complexity, the constant lobbying of 
the so-called stakeholders, the delicate additional negotiated issues such as 
agriculture and investments, only added to the already difficult task of reaching 
consensus. Thus, the Uruguay Round, after many vacillations and turns of events, 
was finally concluded eight years after it had begun, while the Tokyo Round 
needed just five years of intense negotiations. The other rounds, on the other 
hand, took much less time. If we look at the Doha Round from this perspective, 
then things are not very alarming at all. It has only been 6 years since its 
beginning in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, and suspension of talks is not new to the 
negotiators. During the eight years of the Uruguay Round, talks were several 
times abandoned until agreement was reached. Provided that member states 
return to the negotiating table, the Doha Round has nothing to fear. Provided that 
the member states can be persuaded to continue the negotiations. 
The international trade scene has dramatically changed since the GATT 
years. The GATT/WTO negotiations have not always achieved all of their 
proposed agendas, but certain successful steps have been taken. 
If the first four negotiations that took place in Geneva in 1947, in Annecy 
in 1949, in Torquay in 1951 and again in Geneva in 1956, as well as during the 
first round, the Dillon Round, the covered subject was simply tariffs reduction, 
the following talks begun to negotiate additional measures such as anti-dumping 
measures, non-tariff measures etc. The Kennedy Round, in the mid-sixties, added 
a section on development, while the Tokyo Round, during the seventies,   113 
attempted to tackle two new issues, non-tariff trade barriers and a first reform of 
the system. The Tokyo Round had mixed results, in some areas failing 
completely (farm trade), in others breaking new ground and establishing the so-
called “codes”. The last round, the eighth, the Uruguay Round of 1986-94, was 
the last and most extensive of all. It led to the WTO and a new set of agreements, 
taking into account the fact that during the last forty years since the creation of 
the GATT, trade had become far more complex. In major areas, such as 
agriculture, services and investments, the GATT was found wanting. GATT 
members were convinced of the fact that the reinforcement as well the extension 
of the multilateral system had to be attempted.  
The Uruguay Round took seven and a half years to be completed, almost 
twice the original schedule. By the end of the negotiations, 123 countries were 
taking part in the talks. The Round covered almost all trade, “from toothbrushes 
to pleasure boats, from banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild 
rice to AIDS treatments. It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, 
and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history. At times it 
seemed doomed to fail. But in the end, the Uruguay Round brought about the 
biggest reform of the world’s trading system since GATT was created at the end 
of the Second World War. ” (WTO, 2007) 
One of the major successes proclaimed as descending directly form the 
liberalized market is the fact that world trade and production have accelerated 
since the beginning of GATT and namely the creation of the WTO.  
 
Figure 1:  
Acceleration of world trade and production, as a consequence of trade 
liberalization 
 
* (1950 = 100. Trade and GDP: log scale) 
Source: WTO.   114 
 
„The data show a definite statistical link between freer trade and 
economic growth. Economic theory points to strong reasons for the link. All 
countries, including the poorest, have assets - human, industrial, natural, financial 
- which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic 
markets or to compete overseas. Economics tells us that we can benefit when 
these goods and services are traded.” (WTO, 2007) 
If we look at the graph, we notice that both trade and GDP fell in the late 
1920s, before bottoming out in 1932. After World War II, both have risen 
exponentially, most of the time with trade outpacing GDP. “GATT was 
provisional with a limited field of action, but its success over 47 years in 
promoting and securing the liberalization of much of world trade is incontestable. 
Continual reductions in tariffs alone helped spur very high rates of world trade 
growth during the 1950s and 1960s - around 8% a year on average. And the 
momentum of trade liberalization helped ensure that trade growth consistently 
out-paced production growth throughout the GATT era, a measure of countries’ 
increasing ability to trade with each other and to reap the benefits of trade. The 
rush of new members during the Uruguay Round demonstrated that the 
multilateral trading system was recognized as an anchor for development and an 
instrument of economic and trade reform.” (WTO, 2007) 
 
3. WTO’s impasse: the battle of interests 
 
“… if the situation in the trade negotiations does not change soon, 
governments will be forced to confront the unpleasant reality of failure.” (Pascal 
Lamy, 14
th of April 2007) 
 
Thus addressed Pascal Lamy the IMF-World Bank International Monetary 
and Financial Committee in Washington this April. 
Since the suspension of talks in July last year, several efforts were made 
in order to resume negotiations, such as the Salzburg seminar in February this 
year, which reunited the top 50 stakeholders from several countries. According to 
Lamy, political drive can save the Doha Round, since the technical aspects of the 
negotiations can be managed. If only key actors such as the US and the EU, 
joined by developing countries’ representatives, India and Brazil, could sit down 
and reach an agreement, Doha’s problems would be solved. But, despite Lamy’s 
confidence, can developed and developing countries put aside their self interests 
and think only of the general good? Are fairness and reciprocity going to be held 
in higher regard from now on? 
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3.1. Secrecy and unfairness 
 
“I believe that trade opening and reducing trade barriers, has been, is 
and will remain, essential to promote growth and development, to improve 
standards of living and to tackle poverty reduction. The World Trade 
Organization remains the most efficient and most legitimate forum to open and 
regulate world trade. The most efficient because it works at the service of all the 
participants and because of its modern system to solve trade disputes. The most 
legitimate, because it is the fairest system of all, as all the decisions are taken by 
all the members, large or small, strong or weak.” (Pascal Lamy, Director 
General of the WTO) 
 
In this manner Pascal Lamy describes the important role of trade 
liberalization as well as the great mission of the WTO. In his words, the WTO is 
a grand institution with legitimity and a key role in protecting the interests of all 
members, developed and developing countries alike.  
Despite his noble characterization, there have been countless claims that 
the WTO talks are lacking in fairness. According to Brown and Stern (2005), 
„how are nations to judge the fairness of the agreements that may be reached in 
the Doha Development Round? In modifying the global trading system as 
embodied in the GATT/WTO, will these agreements make it fairer? Given the 
self-intrested bias that nations – like individuals – suffer from, there can be no 
answer that satisfies all.”  
Their question is indeed a sensible one, but how does the negotiations 
reality reflect their observations? They continue by stating that „it is, of course, 
true that the most powerful exercice greater influence and that the weak are often 
obliged to compromise. Though, in principle, a country is free to withdraw from 
the GATT/WTO, its loss of rights like the Most Favored Nation treatment or 
access to the dispute settlement machinery is a deterrent. So it is quite possible 
for an individual country to emerge worse off from a particular round of 
negotiations and to find itself with no choice but to accept the worsened status. 
This said, it remains true that if the idea of fairness is persistenly violated, that 
will undermine the cooperation on which the system rests.” 
The Doha Development Round seems to have done just that, or rather, the 
problems of fair play and equality have burst during its mandate. The first such 
problems have arisen after the last GATT round of negotiations, the Uruguay 
Round, which had seen the adoption of a great number of delicate agreements. 
Developing countries have repeatedly asked that some time be spared on the 
„rebalancing” of these agreements before the start of a new round of talks in other 
areas. Their position, they argued, was a direct consequence of the fact that many   116 
of the agreements signed during the Uruguay Round, such as the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Trade-Related Investment Measures 
and the Agriculture Agreement, were not in their best interest. 
At Doha, developing countries managed to include on the agenda two 
developing issues, namely the „implementation issues” and the „special and 
differential treatment”. Both their requests, the further discussion of the difficult 
agreements and these two development issues, were accorded low priority during 
the negotiations. Worst of all, the development issues were treated with such lack 
of defference vis-à-vis the market access issues, that the deadline for the first 
were scheduled after that of the market access issues.  
Indeed, agricultural talks have monopolized the so-called development 
negotiations. Development issues, even though they were publicly supported, 
turned out not to be a priority after all. In the end, talks were suspended because 
the G6 was not able to come to terms concerning the agricultural offers, the 
development agenda playing no part in their dissagreement. 
Further on, the developed countries, apart from monopolizing the 
negotiations, have started using deceiving measures in their offers. Instead of 
cleanly cutting their trade-distorting support levels, they have simply transfered 
some of these in the so-called Green Box, which supposedly holds only those 
subsidies that do not have a distorting effect upon competition. According to Das 
(2006) „the really significant escape route is the Green Box which amounts to 
US$50 billion and Euro 22 billion in 2000 respectively in the United States and 
EU and the possibility of unlimited increase in future... Thus the Green Box, 
particularly its window of „decoupled income support” will continue to be the 
route to give farmers unlimited amounts of subsidies.” 
Such unfair practices are to be taken into account together with the fact 
that many a time, only a few member states get to be a part of the delicate 
negotiation talks, most of them being put into the situation in which they simply 
have to agree on what has already been decided in secret, by closed groups of 
interest.   
 
3.2. Groups of interests worlds apart 
 
“…many developing countries have spoken up on how only a few 
members seem to be dominating the negotiations.  The agriculture negotiations 
were initially conducted mainly and exclusively by the so-called “Five Interested 
Parties” (US, EU, Brazil, India and Australia); and then Japan was included to 
form the G6. The other WTO members were expected to wait for the G6 to reach 
agreement among themselves, and their role was seen to be confined to endorsing 
any deal reached by the six. Often the majority of the members were kept waiting   117 
for the six to make a decision, without even knowing what was being discussed by 
them, what the different positions were, or even where they were meeting.” 
(Khor, 2006:3) 
 
After all that we have presented about the WTO and the way negotiations 
are conducted, we can very clearly see that a certain number of interest groups 
are making the rules or rather, breaking them, as they go along. 
At first glance, it will be easy to spot these factions: developed countries 
at one end, developing countries at the other. Unfortunately, things are a little bit 
more complicated. Groups within groups are defending their own interests, and if 
talks have been stalled, it is because there seems to be no middle ground for the 
many factions fighting for their slice of the pie. As Bhagwati (2005) commented, 
“the most difficult issue is agriculture, of course, where we have had the US and 
EU playing ping pong with offers and counter offers, with Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson playing for maneuver between France and its allies, who want to 
make no serious accommodation, and principally the Nordic countries and Britain 
who do.” 
But since Cancún, a new group emerged, the G20, comprising of a 
number of developing countries that include India and Brazil as their foremost 
representatives. These countries have experienced economic growth during the 
last years, they know what they want and they have learned how to get it. The 
WTO holds no threat or secrets for them. Thus, they have become a powerful 
voice in the negotiations, and without their support, few agreements can be 
reached. 
Those countries that have the most to lose from this transformation of the 
negotiations, however, are those countries that are economically unpriviledged, 
have an inadequate political and diplomatic will and, worst of all, are unable to 
grasp the full implication of the extremely technical language, full of formulae 
and coefficients, used during the talks. Most of them will understand the real 
meaning hidded behind the numbers long after the agreements have been signed. 
And it is not their fault. Negotiators do their best to surround their proposals in 
numbers so that their interests can be protected. And who can blame them? They 
have done so until now, and it has worked. Mostly for the developed countries, it 
is true, but things are about to change. 
Since more and more interest groups have been formed, such as the G20, 
the G6, the ACP Group or the G33, not to forget the old EU and the US, 
negotiations have become a battleground of interests. Each faction coming with 
its own proposal, only to be discarded due to the lack of agreement from the other 
groups. Until countries believe once again that by striving for the general good,   118 
their individual interests will be taken care off, the Doha Round’s situation is 
bound to remain bleak. 
 
4. Who will save the Doha Development Round? 
 
4.1. The US, a key role in the negotiations 
 
“A breakthrough in the negotiations in the next few weeks would send a 
much needed message of confidence, that WTO members remain committed to 
open markets and multilateral rules and that the foundations of the global 
economy are reinforced. This is perfectly doable. The challenge is less technical, 
than political. It is about leadership, about compromise, about countries 
recognizing their common interest in success and the collective costs of failure. I 
am confident that the United States will put all its energy and commitment into 
concluding the Doha Round. US leadership is always required to sustain the 
WTO but the exercise of this leadership by the Administration and Congress in 
the weeks and months ahead will be key to the fate of the Round. At this critical 
juncture in the negotiations, the WTO urgently needs their full support.” (Pascal 
Lamy, 23rd of April 2007) 
 
After the suspension of the WTO negotiations last year, the Director 
General of the institution, Pascal Lamy, has delivered a series of moving 
speeches in which he first attempted to raise the spirits of the member states into 
going back to the negotiating table and reaching an agreement. But coaxing and 
yearning has gotten him no further so now, after trying to address the negotiator’s 
worst fears of failure, Pascal Lamy has decided to turn to the one member that 
can make a difference. 
And a difference it made indeed, when in July of 2006 the talks were 
disrupted as a direct effect of the refusal or possibly the inability of the United 
States to come with a better offer in the agriculture dispute.  
The US did not only come with an unacceptable offer regarding its trade-
distorting support level, it brought fourth an offer that had higher levels than the 
previous years. And all this when they were supposed to cut their initial levels. 
Now the US offer has triggered a blockage of talks, and corroborated with the 
fact that the US fast-track authority will end by the 30
th of July this year, unless 
something is done, Doha’s chances for reaching consensus are very small indeed.  
Thus, Lamy appealed to the United States from a double perspective: not 
only are they principally responsible for the dead-end reached by the member 
states at the negotiation table, but they are also the centre pillar in these   119 
discussions. Indeed, according to Lamy, US leadership is “key” to the 
breakthrough of the negotiations.  
Thus, US leadership might be the answer in saving the Doha Round. Or 
maybe, the cooperation between major member states such as the US, the EU, 
India and Brazil could prove to be a miraculous solution to our problems. And 
then again, maybe not. Maybe the answer lies elsewhere.    
 
4.2. Change, a possible solution?   
 
“With the election of Pascal Lamy as Director-General of the WTO, a 
new era has begun. Lamy is notorious for his remarks, in the context of the 
Cancún failure, that the WTO operated as a “medieval” organization. The 
implication is that unless some institutional issues are addressed in the present, it 
may not be possible to negotiate successfully the Doha Round.” (Howse, 2005:2) 
 
During the seminar entitled “Realizing the Doha Development Agenda as 
if the Future Mattered,” a seminar hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Salzburg 
Seminar, in Salzburg, Austria, in February of 2007, Susan Sechler and Joe 
Guinan made a very interesting point. According to them, the only chance the 
Doha Round has is if the Development Agenda is given top priority.  
In their opinion, “while it is frequently bemoaned that designating the 
Doha Round as a “development round” has made negotiations more difficult, the 
designation may offer the only solution to the larger questions of legitimacy and 
credibility facing the WTO and the global trade regime. This is the main reason 
why “development” should not be seen as an add-on grafted onto the trade talks, 
but as part of the WTO’s core mission to regulate trade, up there with – but not 
eclipsing – the technical focus on mechanisms of freer trade. At this point 
governments face the stark choice of negotiating a genuine development round or 
accepting failure.” 
A reform of the WTO and its negotiation mechanisms could also be an 
interesting solution. In Lamy’s own words, after the Cancún collapse, the WTO is 
a “medieval” institution that could very well benefit from change.  
Also, a change of perspective for the developing countries may be a 
solution. In Bhagwati’s view (2005): “there is need to have the poor countries 
overcome their fear of trade liberalization by providing the institutional support 
for the potential downside that may arise. Two issues need to be addressed, in 
particular. If poor countries which are dependent on tariff revenues as a large 
fraction of their budget for social spending were to lose revenues if they cut their 
tariffs - Art Laffer and Milton Friedman would remind us that the revenues may   120 
actually rise, and there is empirical evidence that in some cases it did - , then 
international agencies such as the World Bank should stand ready to provide 
offsetting aid until as long as it takes to fix the tax system to raise revenues in 
other, more appropriate ways. Then again, the developing countries need 
adjustment assistance to cope economically and politically with the effect of 
import competition in specific industries. Western nations have such Adjustment 
Assistance programs, the US since 1962 when one was started to provide support 
for the Kennedy Round. Again, the World Bank is an ideal source for such 
support, both to design and to finance such programs in the developing countries 
that liberalize their economies. In the absence of such safety nets, these countries 
cannot be expected to walk out on the high wire of globalization. Fortunately, the 





“Of course, all MTN Rounds have succeeded in the end. The roller 
coaster analogy therefore does not work fully: the roller coaster comes back to 
where the ride began whereas the Rounds go on to success! But success does not 
always breed success: there is always the first time for failure.Yes, we will lose 
possibly substantial gains from trade if the Doha Round fails; but we will 
survive.”(Bhagwati, 2005:2, 9) 
 
The Doha Round has been subject to a lot of controversy, from the very 
moment of its creation, in 2001, and at times it seemed that it will never make it. 
This is just such a time.  
The initial attempt to launch the WTO’s first round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in Seattle in November 1999 collapsed, and the round was finally 
launched in Doha, Qatar, two years later.  
Since then, Doha experienced several dead-ends, the most famous being 
in Cancún, Mexico, between the 10th and the 14th of September 2003, were there 
was a lot of dissent that led to the collapse of the negotiations, due to the lack of 
consensus, especially on agricultural liberalization. The “Singapore issues” were 
one of the few successes that Cancún can boast, as well as an agreement meant 
for the relaxation of the TRIPS.  
The Cancún conference ended without consensus. Ten months later, the 
deadlock was broken in Geneva when the General Council agreed on the “July 
package” in the early hours of 1st of August 2004, which kicked off negotiations 
in trade facilitation but not the three other Singapore issues. The delay meant the 
1st of  January 2005 deadline for finishing the talks could not be met.   121 
Unofficially, members aimed to complete the next phase of the negotiations at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, between the 13th and the 18th of December 
2005, including full “modalities” in agriculture and market access for non-
agricultural products, and to finish the talks by the end of the following year.  
But in July of 2006, negotiations were actually suspended, and now, 
almost a year later, things seem not to have changed. WTO’s Director General, 
Pascal Lamy has taken great pains in trying to bring back the member states at 
the negotiations table, but the interested parties are hard to convince, especially 
when each group is defending its own interests. In the end, Lamy has called for 
US leadership in order to solve the problem, and if this was a wise decision, it 
remains to be seen. 
In our opinion, Lamy’s characterization of the WTO as a „medieval” 
institution is quite accurate and until major reforms are not seriously made, things 
will doubtly improve. And if things are not to improve and the Doha Round is to 
be a failure, then what? 
As Bhagwati (2005) so beautifully put it: „Then again, will the failure of 
Doha mean that massive gains from trade will be lost to one and all? That 
depends, of course, on what Doha can reasonably be expected to achieve. As with 
the Uruguay Round, when different computable models of trade were used to 
indicate great gains, there is a danger that the estimates of enormous gains from 
trade are currently being bandied about from substantial liberalization under the 
Doha Round. There will certainly be loss of some gains from trade; and any gain 
is welcome. But no one benefits from exaggeration and ballooning up of numbers 
in huge models that few understand and which obscure a slew of assumptions 
about matters such as the responses of farmers in Botswana and Uganda to 
estimated price change in response to removal of a price support in the EU that 
must be made in the teeth of little empirical knowledge. The economist John 
Whalley, who is arguably the best practitioner of such large models, had this to 
say about the models that had been produced to examine the effects of the 
prospective Uruguay Round tariff cuts on the developing countries: “…there are 
substantial, and at times hard to explain inconsistencies across model results. One 
model shows most of the gains come from agricultural liberalization, another 
from textiles, and yet another from tariff cuts. One model shows developing 
countries losing from the elimination of the MFA, another shows them as large 
gainers. … These differences occur even where similar data sets and benchmark 
years are used.” A little restraint in citing the estimates of the massive gains from 
trade liberalization under Doha is in order. Yes, we will lose possibly substantial 
gains from trade if it fails; but we will survive.” 
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